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Risk Matrix Driven Supply Chain Risk Management: Adapting Risk Matrix
Based Tools To Modelling Interdependent Risks and Risk Appetite
Abstract
There is a major research gap of developing a supply chain risk management process integrating risk
appetite of the decision maker and all stages of the risk management process within an interdependent
network of systemic risks. We introduce an iterative process, namely risk matrix driven supply chain
risk management, to bridge this gap. We make use of the recently introduced concept of utility
indifference curves based risk matrix to capture the risk attitude of the decision maker. We also present
algorithms for assessing and mitigating interdependent risks for risk-neutral and risk-averse/seeking
decision makers and demonstrate the application of our proposed process through a simulation study.
Utilising the method of cost-benefit analysis within an interdependent setting of interacting risks and
risk mitigation strategies, we also propose a second approach that can help a decision maker determine
a set of Pareto-optimal risk mitigation strategies and select optimal solutions subject to the budget
constraint and specific risk appetite.
Keywords: Supply chain risk management, systemic risks, risk appetite, utility
indifference curves, risk matrix, algorithms
1. Introduction
Risk management is a continuous process comprising sequential stages of risk identification, risk
analysis, risk evaluation, risk treatment and risk monitoring (SA, 2009). Supply chain risk manage-
ment (SCRM) is the “implementation of strategies to manage both everyday and exceptional risks along
the supply chain based on continuous risk assessment with the objective of reducing vulnerability and5
ensuring continuity” (Wieland & Wallenburg, 2012, pp. 890-891). Adapting the established risk man-
agement framework (SA, 2009), researchers have been proposing various SCRM frameworks (Tummala
& Schoenherr, 2011; Heckmann et al., 2015; Ho et al., 2015). Besides these frameworks, a number of
models and tools have been developed focusing on different stages of the SCRM process (Fahimnia
et al., 2015).10
Supply chain risks have been generally classified into independent categories (Rao & Goldsby,
2009) like physical, financial, information, relational and innovation (Cavinato, 2004; Spekman &
Davis, 2004). The same independent categories of risks are adopted and reflected in the conventional
risk matrix based tools used by the practitioners (Norrman & Jansson, 2004; Khan et al., 2008).
Limited articles in the literature on risk management in general (Ackermann et al., 2014) and SCRM15
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in particular (Garvey et al., 2015; Qazi et al., 2017) have focused on the shortcoming of conventional
techniques of risk identification and emphasised the need for capturing systemic interactions between
risks. Risk assessment/evaluation and risk treatment following the conventional risk identification
techniques yield sub-optimal solutions as these techniques fail to account for complex dynamics across
the risks and risk sources (Ackermann et al., 2014).20
Risk appetite of the decision maker drives the tolerance level with respect to the acceptance of
risks. According to Heckmann et al. (2015, p. 127): “The decision maker’s degree of acceptance
with respect to the deterioration of target-values defines his attitude towards supply chain risk. Risk-
averse supply chain managers only accept a minor deterioration of target values of an efficiency- (or
effectiveness-) based supply chain goal in exchange for the adherence or increase of an effectiveness-25
(or efficiency-) based supply chain goal. Risk-seeking decision makers, however, accept higher degrees
of value deterioration of a specific goal in exchange for the adherence or increase of an opposite one.
Risk-neutral supply chain managers prefer neither of the two objective types”. Very few frameworks in
SCRM have captured the risk appetite of the decision maker (Knemeyer et al., 2009; Lavastre et al.,
2012); however, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no existing study has ever investigated designing30
a risk management framework within a network setting of interacting risks driven by the risk appetite
of the decision maker.
Integration of utility indifference curves within the risk matrix has been recently introduced in
the literature on risk management that results in discretising the risk matrix into five risk zones:
Negligible –no need for further concern; Acceptable –need for monitoring the risks with no investment;35
Controllable –need for adopting emergency plans; Critical –need for mitigating risks as long as the
benefits exceed the costs; and Unacceptable –need for bringing the risks down to the critical level at
any cost (Ruan et al., 2015). However, the following question remains un-answered so far: Whether the
concept of utility indifference curves based risk matrix for assessing independent risks can be developed
further to account for interdependent risks?40
Recently, few studies have focused on proposing probabilistic supply chain risks for assessing and
managing interdependent risks. Selection of optimal risk mitigation strategies has also gained limited
attention both in the literature on risk management in general (Spackova & Straub, 2015) and SCRM
in particular (Tuncel & Alpan, 2010; Micheli et al., 2014; Aqlan & Lam, 2015) but the main challenge
is to develop these studies further to capture the risk appetite of the decision maker as well. The main45
research question driving our research project is: How can we design a SCRM process integrating the
systemic interaction between risks and the risk appetite of the decision maker?
In this study, we aim to contribute to the field of SCRM by introducing a major research gap that
has gained limited attention so far. Furthermore, we introduce a new risk management process, namely
risk matrix driven supply chain risk management (RMSCRM), and demonstrate why it is important50
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to close the identified research gap and to follow our proposed process. We present algorithms for
assessing and mitigating interdependent risks with regard to the risk-neutral and risk-averse/seeking
decision makers. We transform the conventional risk matrix in order to make it compatible for assessing
interdependent risks in relation to utility indifference curves specific to the decision maker. We also
introduce a second approach to help supply chain risk managers identify the Pareto-optimal set of risk55
mitigation strategies and select optimal solutions subject to the budget constraint and specific risk
appetite.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: A brief review of the relevant literature
is presented in section 2. Background knowledge about the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) and a
motivational example are described in section 3 and section 4, respectively. The proposed risk matrix60
based process and approach are described in section 5. The application of the proposed risk matrix
based process is demonstrated through a simulation study in section 6. The second approach of
selecting optimal strategies without using the risk matrix is introduced and illustrated in section 7.
Merits and limitations of the proposed approaches are discussed in section 8. Finally, we conclude our
paper with important findings and present future research themes in section 9.65
2. Literature Review
A number of articles focusing on the SCRM process/framework and literature reviews were critically
analysed in order to address the research question. In this section, we will present a brief overview of
the existing SCRM frameworks and delineate a major research gap meriting extensive research.
Harland et al. (2003) developed a supply network risk management tool and applied it to the70
electronics industry through conducting four case studies. The main merit of the tool is its exclusive
focus on collaborative risk management achieved through engaging the stakeholders across a supply
network. Building on the same concept of network-wide management of risks, Hallikas et al. (2004)
introduced a risk management process integrating different perspectives of supply chain actors and
emphasised the need for adopting systems approach in order to understand the complex dynamics75
across a network. A systems-oriented SCRM process is also introduced by Oehmen et al. (2009)
that captures the interdependency between risks. Advocating the need for adapting the degree of
risk management with regard to the contextual factors, Giunipero & Eltantawy (2004) introduced
a risk management framework contingent on four determinants: degree of product technology; need
for security; importance of the supplier; and purchaser’s prior experience with the situation. The80
Supply Chain Operations Reference (SCOR) model has been modified and considered as an important
framework for managing supply chain risks (Sinha et al., 2004; Rotaru et al., 2014). The main limitation
of the aforementioned studies and other risk management frameworks proposed by Manuj & Mentzer
(2008), Khan et al. (2008) and Tummala & Schoenherr (2011) is their limited focus on capturing the
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interdependency between risks.85
Only two of the selected studies (Knemeyer et al., 2009; Lavastre et al., 2012) considered the
risk appetite of the decision maker as an important factor and included it in the SCRM framework.
Although risk attitude has been considered in the modelling framework of a number of studies as
mentioned in the literature review conducted by Heckmann et al. (2015), these articles fail to meet
the selection criterion of this study because of their focus on a specific stage of the risk management90
process.
Among the quantitative studies, Tuncel & Alpan (2010) used a timed Petri nets framework to model
and analyse a supply chain which is subject to various risks. They used Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) to identify important risks having higher values of Risk Priority Number (RPN).
Elleuch et al. (2014) proposed a comprehensive risk management process integrating the techniques95
of FMEA, design of experiments, Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) and a desirability function ap-
proach. Micheli et al. (2014) and Aqlan & Lam (2015) introduced optimisation-based techniques for
selecting optimal risk mitigation strategies. Although all the mentioned quantitative studies consider
interdependency between risks and strategies, critical aspect of modelling interdependency between
risks and the risk appetite of a decision maker is ignored. Utilising Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs),100
Garvey et al. (2015) introduced risk measures for prioritising interdependent supply chain risks assum-
ing a risk-neutral decision maker whereas Qazi et al. (2017) introduced probabilistic supply chain risk
measures to prioritise interdependent risks and strategies. Although one of the measures introduced
captures risk-averse appetite, the entire risk management process does not explicitly model the risk
attitude of a decision maker.105
A number of articles focusing on literature reviews were also reviewed (Ju¨ttner et al., 2003; Tang,
2006; Khan & Burnes, 2007; Natarajarathinam et al., 2009; Rao & Goldsby, 2009; Ponomarov &
Holcomb, 2009; Olson & Wu, 2010; Tang & Nurmaya Musa, 2011; Ghadge et al., 2012; Colicchia &
Strozzi, 2012; Sodhi et al., 2012; Ho et al., 2015; Heckmann et al., 2015) and it was revealed that
only two studies have emphasised the need for modelling interdependency between risks hereby: “...110
developing structured and systematic tools for risk identification and assessment that explicitly consider
the dynamic interactions among supply chain partners and among risk sources” (Colicchia & Strozzi,
2012, p. 412), and “... While focusing on a particular risk type has its advantages, interdependencies
and interrelationships among various risk types is certainly an issue that needs to be further explored.
Investigating the joint impact of such risks can lead to better management of supply chains than treating115
each risk type in isolation” (Ho et al., 2015, p. 5060).
Similarly, despite the fact that existing SCRM frameworks fail to integrate all stages of the risk
management process within an interdependent setting of risks and strategies, only two articles have
highlighted the importance of conducting research in this direction: “The multidimensional perspective
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focusing on management processes, risk dimensions, impact flows and mitigation alternatives needs120
to be studied in whole” (Ghadge et al., 2012, p. 329), and “As there is a significant relationship
between all SCRM processes, more attention should be given to legitimately integrated processes instead
of individual or fragmented processes” (Ho et al., 2015, p. 5053). Another major issue concerning these
studies is their limited focus on the need for integrating risk appetite in the risk management process as
only Heckmann et al. (2015) argue that “More advanced (context-sensitive) approaches especially with125
respect to the risk attitude of the decision maker and with respect to the environment of the affected
supply chain are needed” (Heckmann et al., 2015, p. 130). A critical review of the selected articles
focusing on the SCRM process/framework and literature reviews reveal a finding that an integrated
risk management framework considering the interdependency between risks and mitigation strategies
and the risk appetite of a decision maker has neither been explored nor mentioned as a research gap130
for directing future research.
3. Expected Utility and Decision Making Under Uncertainty
Within the context of decision making under uncertainty, risk can be related to a utility function
that reflects the preference of a decision maker with regards to various possible losses or consequences of
a decision. According to Aven (2012), if X and u(X) represent the possible outcomes associated with a135
decision and utility function respectively, then the expected utility E[u(X)] provides a decision criterion
where probabilities and a utility function are assigned on the set of outcomes and a rational decision
maker selects an action that maximises the expected utility value. The utility function represents the
risk attitude of a decision maker where a risk-neutral decision maker would be indifferent between
two outcomes having the same expected value and a risk-seeking (averse) individual would consider140
uncertainty to be an (un)favorable phenomenon. The following equations (inequalities) represent
different risk attitudes (Aven, 2012):
Risk-neutral : E[u(X)] = u(E[X]) (1)
Risk-averse : E[u(X)] < u(E[X]) (2)
Risk-seeking : E[u(X)] > u(E[X]) (3)
For gaining an insight into developing the utility function, interested readers may consult Kainuma145
& Tawara (2006). Although EUT provides a standardised normative framework to make decisions
under uncertainty, it is not so much used in practice mainly because of the difficulty associated with
assigning utility values to all possible outcomes (Aven & Kristensen, 2005). Also, a decision maker in
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many cases would not seek to maximise the expected utility but rather solutions yielding satisfactory
results might be preferred. Use of cost-benefit analysis (Spackova & Straub, 2015) and risk matrix150
based tools (Duijm, 2015) are widely reported in the literature where instead of utilising an array
of utility values for all possible outcomes, the decision maker maps risks on a two-dimensional plane
with associated probability and loss values and a simple approach is adopted to manage risks through
the lens of cost-benefit analysis balancing costs with the benefits. The proposed method is aimed at
enhancing the risk matrix and cost-benefit analysis based approach to account for interdependencies155
between supply chain risks and strategies and the risk appetite of a decision maker.
4. Existing SCRM Process and Concept of Utility Indifference Curves Based Risk Matrix
There is a consensus among researchers that the SCRM process comprises five sequential stages:
risk identification; assessment; analysis; treatment; and monitoring (Giannakis & Papadopoulos, 2016)
that are analogous to the stages of the standard risk management process (SA, 2009). We present a160
simple example to illustrate these stages and identify the main issue with adopting this process in case
of interdependent risks. In the risk identification stage, specific risks must be identified. Let us assume
that there are five risks namely R1, R2, R3, R4 and R5 that have been identified for a hypothetical
supply chain using standard tools of checklists, risk mapping and taxonomies. In the risk assessment
stage, each risk is assigned the probability and impact values and in our example, we assign arbitrary165
values to the risks as shown in Table 1. These risks are subsequently mapped on a risk matrix for the
sake of prioritisation (risk analysis) and selecting risk mitigation actions (risk treatment).







A risk matrix is a two-dimensional plot of risks characterised by the corresponding probability
and impact values. For a detailed overview of the history of risk matrix based tools and associated
shortcomings, interested readers may refer to the study conducted by Duijm (2015). One of the main170
limitations of these tools is their lack of capturing the risk attitude of a decision maker. Using utility
theory, Ruan et al. (2015) introduced a three step process for integrating risk attitude in the risk
matrix by: (a) describing risk attitudes of decision makers by utility functions; (b) introducing utility
indifference curves and embedding these into the risk matrix; and (c) discretising utility indifference
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curves. Integration of indifference curves representing the decision maker’s preferences within the175
risk matrix results in discretising the risk matrix into five risk zones: Negligible –no need for further
concern; Acceptable –need for monitoring the risks with no investment; Controllable –need for adopting
emergency plans; Critical –need for mitigating risks as long as the benefits exceed the costs; and
Unacceptable –need for bringing the risks down to the critical level at any cost.
The first step involves establishing the utility function of a decision maker. As opposed to the180
concept of utility adopted in the standard expected utility approach where utility is mapped over the
set of all possible outcomes, the utility function used here represents the utility of a decision maker
with respect to the loss realising from an individual risk. In this example, we assume that the decision
maker is risk-neutral (utility of loss [u(l)] = loss). The utility indifference curves segregate the entire
risk matrix into five regions: unacceptable; critical; controllable; acceptable; and negligible risk zones185
(Ruan et al., 2015). Therefore, we need a total of four utility indifference curves in order to establish the
boundaries of these five regions as shown in Figure 1. Each indifference curve represents a particular
risk level comprising a number of points with different combinations of probability and utility of loss
values. Equation 4 represents a utility indifference curve where p′ and u(l′) are the probability and
utility of loss values, respectively specific to a reference point on the curve (Ruan et al., 2015).190
p ∗ u(l) = p′ ∗ u(l′) (4)
Considering the reference point as having a probability of 1, Equation 4 is transformed as follows:
p ∗ u(l) = u(l′) (5)
The value of u(l′) is unique for each curve and influenced by the risk appetite of a decision maker.
For a detailed discussion on selecting the reference points and segregating the risk matrix into risk
zones, interested readers may refer to Ruan et al. (2015). In the case of a risk-neutral decision maker,
Equation 5 is reduced to:195
p ∗ l = u(l′) (6)
The five zones representing relative importance of risks are unacceptable (R-I), critical (R-II),
controllable (R-III), acceptable (R-IV) and negligible (R-V) as shown in Figure 1. The unacceptable
zone also includes the area of the risk matrix beyond the threshold impact (in this case, above the
line: impact=1500). We have assumed that 1500 is the maximum tolerance level of the decision maker
beyond which a risk with any probability value must be mitigated. Each risk considered in our example200
occupies a specific zone. The values of u(l′) (corresponding to the reference points A, B, C and D)
specific to the four indifference curves are assumed as −695, −521, −347 and −174, respectively.
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Figure 3: Utility indifference curves based risk matrix 
As R1 is an unacceptable risk, it must be mitigated at any cost. R5 must be mitigated if the benefit 
exceeds the cost. We can identify a strategy or combinations of strategies that would either reduce the 
probability or impact of a risk or a set of risks. It is very easy to conduct the risk treatment as we only 
need to evaluate the benefits through executing simple arithmetic operations and weigh these against 
the total cost of implementing strategies. Therefore, we can prioritise risks and select optimal strategies 
through following a sequential risk management process. During the risk monitoring stage, any new 
risk(s) and/or changes in the parameters of existing risks must be incorporated in the risk matrix.  
3.3.  Motivation and Significance of the Research 
Now let us consider that instead of a set of independent risks, we are dealing with a network of risks 
where there are interdependencies between risks and a risk might have a (positive or negative) 
correlation with another risk or a set of risks. Similarly, a mitigation strategy can have an association with 
multiple risks or multiple strategies can influence a single risk. Existing frameworks fail to account for 
evaluation and treatment of such network of risks. In the case of interdependent risks, we need to 
marginalise the probability values through assigning conditional probability values to the risks. Similarly, 
the existing risk matrix based tools are not capable of projecting the criticality of interdependent risks. 
Furthermore, the criterion for conducting cost-benefit analysis for the network of risks and potential 
strategies taking into account the risk appetite of the decision maker and linking it back to the 
performance of individual risks on the risk matrix is not established. In the case of risk treatment, we can 
























Figure 1: Utility indifference curves based risk matrix.
As R1 is an unacceptable risk, it must be mitigated at any cost. R5 must be mitigated if the benefit
exceeds the cost. We c n identify a strategy or combinations f strategies th t would either reduce
the probability or impact of a risk or a set of risks. It is very easy to conduct the risk treatment as205
we only need to evaluate the ben fits through executing simple rithmetic operations and weigh these
against the total cost of implementing strategies. Therefore, we can prioritise risks and select optimal
strategies through following a sequential risk management process. During the risk monitoring stage,
any new risk(s) and/or changes in the parameters of existing risks must be incorporated in the risk
matrix.210
4.1. Motivation for Developing a New Process
Now let us consider that instead of a set of independent risks, we are dealing with a network of
risks where there are interdependencies between risks and a risk might have a (positive or negative)
correlation with another risk or a set of risks. Similarly, a mitigation strategy can have an association
with multiple risks or multiple strategies can influence a single risk. Existing frameworks fail to account215
for evaluation and treatment of such network of risks. In the case of interdependent risks, we need
to marginalise the probability values through assigning conditional probability values to the risks.
The existing risk matrix based tools are not capable of projecting the criticality of interdependent
risks. Furthermore, the criterion for conducting cost-benefit analysis for the network of risks and
potential strategies taking into account the risk appetite of a decision maker and linking it back to the220
performance of individual risks on the risk matrix is not established. In the case of risk treatment,
we can no longer rely on simple mathematical operations as each potential strategy or a combination
of strategies must be linked to the risk network and the marginal probability values of risks must be
re-evaluated and the resulting risks mapped again on the risk matrix. Therefore, it makes the process
as iterative rather than sequential.225
EUT being widely used in decision making under uncertainty provides a systematic approach of
evaluating optimal strategies (Aven, 2015); however, even for a very simple network of 5 risks and 5
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strategies, a total of 1024 values must be elicited from the decision maker with regard to the utility
of different combinations of risks and strategies. Furthermore, as reported in the literature on risk
management, practitioners rely on risk matrix based tools to prioritise risks (Ruan et al., 2015).230
Therefore, we aim to propose a method through modifying the utility indifference curves based risk
matrix (Ruan et al., 2015) and utilising cost-benefit analysis to prioritise supply chain risk mitigation
strategies taking into account the risk appetite of a decision maker.
5. Proposed Risk Matrix Driven Supply Chain Risk Management Process
We adapt the established risk management framework (SA, 2009) as it is used widely both by235
researchers and practitioners (Khan et al., 2008). Although the description of terms and concepts
used in the framework is controversial (Aven, 2011), our focus is limited to the stages involved in the
process. The proposed process is shown in Figure 2. Instead of treating risks in isolation, we introduce
the concept by developing a risk network. The process starts with the specification of context in terms
of defining the boundary of a supply chain/network and identifying the stakeholders involved in the240
risk management process.
Risk network identification is a critical stage where there is a need for bringing a paradigm shift as
the existing literature is rife with conventional tools and techniques of identifying risk categories and
the concept of developing causal risk paths/risk network has gained limited attention (Garvey et al.,
2015). Besides identifying the risks and risk sources, potential risk mitigation strategies must also be245
included within the network. Risk network analysis involves determining the (conditional) probability
values and loss values associated with risks subject to the implementation of specific risk mitigation
strategies.
In the risk network evaluation stage, there is a need to explore new risk measures that can be
computed easily and are capable of capturing the network-wide impact of risks. The measures are250
also influenced by the risk appetite. In addition to registering the holistic impact of risks within the
network setting, there is also a need for visualising the impact of each risk on the network of risks and
ensuring that all risks are mitigated to the required level. Therefore, a modified risk matrix capable of
evaluating interdependent risks coupled with the mapping of utility indifference curves (Ruan et al.,
2015) must be developed and consulted for risk network evaluation as shown in Figure 3.255
As the objective of our research is to introduce a risk management process for interdependent
risks, we are not focusing on the techniques for establishing the risk appetite of a decision maker and
mapping utility indifference curves on the modified risk matrix. The procedure proposed by Ruan
et al. (2015) can be utilised for implementing the proposed process. However, we are not dealing
with the discretisation of risk matrix because of the probability and loss values used in the proposed260


























Figure 4: Supply chain risk network management (SCRNM)  
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Figure 2: Risk matrix driven supply chain risk management (RMSCRM).
As the objective of our research is to introduce a risk management process for interdependent risks, we 
are not focusing on the techniques for establishing the risk appetite of the decision maker and mapping 
utility indifference curves on the modified risk matrix. The procedure proposed by Ruan et al. (2015) can 
be utilised for implementing the proposed process. However, we are not dealing with the discretisation 
of risk matrix because of the probability and loss values used in the proposed risk management process. 
Appropriate risk measures representing the network wide holistic impact of risks can be used for risk 
analysis/evaluation and corresponding to each combination of strategies, the configuration of individual 
risks (R1, R2, R3, R4) can be mapped on the modified risk matrix. The matrix is bounded by the upper 
limit of loss beyond which a risk irrespective of its probability value must be treated.  
Risk network treatment deals with the evaluation of different combinations of risk mitigation strategies 
within the network setting. The modified risk matrix provides a lens to evaluate the efficacy of strategies 
and establish if additional strategies must be implemented. The proposed process flow is in contrast with 
the one established in extant literature as instead of following a unidirectional flow, it is an iterative 
process where evaluation of each combination of strategies necessitates re-assessing and re-evaluating 
the risk network. The iterative process results in the selection of an optimal combination of strategies 
that not only considers the network wide holistic effect of these strategies but also yields an acceptable 
configuration of risks mapped on the modified risk matrix. The matrix also helps in identifying critical 
risks that must be monitored periodically. After determining the optimal combination of strategies, these 
are implemented and as risk management is a continuous process, there is a need for continuously 
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Figure 3: Mapping from risk network evaluation to modified risk matrix.
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risks can be used for risk analysis/evaluation and corresponding to each combination of strategies, the
configuration of individual risks (R1, R2, R3, R4) can be mapped on the modified risk matrix. The
matrix is bounded by the upper limit of loss beyond which a risk irrespective of its probability value
must be treated.265
Risk network treatment deals with the evaluation of different combinations of risk mitigation strate-
gies within the network setting. The modified risk matrix provides a lens to evaluate the efficacy of
strategies and establish if additional strategies must be implemented. The proposed process flow is in
contrast with the one established in extant literature as instead of following a unidirectional flow, it
is an iterative process where evaluation of each combination of strategies necessitates re-assessing and270
re-evaluating the risk network. The iterative process results in the selection of an optimal combination
of strategies that not only considers the network-wide holistic effect of these strategies but also yields
an acceptable configuration of risks mapped on the modified risk matrix. The matrix also helps in
identifying critical risks that must be monitored periodically. After determining the optimal combina-
tion of strategies, these are implemented and as risk management is a continuous process, there is a275
need for continuously monitoring risks and updating the risk network on a regular basis.
5.1. Proposed Approach
5.1.1. Modelling Assumptions
The model is based on the following assumptions:
• Supply chain risks, corresponding sources and potential mitigation strategies are known and these280
can be modelled as an acyclic directed graph.
• All random variables and risk mitigation strategies are represented by binary states.
• Conditional probability values for the risks and associated losses can be elicited from the stake-
holders and the resulting network represents close approximation to the actual perceived risks
and interdependency between different risks.285
• Cost associated with each potential risk mitigation strategy is known.
5.1.2. Supply Chain Risk Network
A discrete supply chain risk network RN = (X,G,P, L, U,C) is a six-tuple consisting of:
• a directed acyclic graph (DAG), G = (V,E) , with nodes, V , representing discrete risks and risk
sources, XR, discrete risk mitigation strategies, XS , and directed links, E, encoding dependence290
relations,
• a set of conditional probability distributions, P , containing a distribution, P (XRi |Xpa(Ri)), for
each risk and risk source, XRi ,
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• a set of loss functions, L, containing one loss function, l(Xpa(V )), for each node v in the subset
Vl ∈ V of loss nodes,295
• a set of utility functions, U , containing one utility function, u(Xpa(V )), for each node v in the
subset Vu ∈ V of utility nodes,
• a set of cost functions, C, containing one cost function, c(Xpa(V )), for each node v in the subset
Vc ∈ V of cost nodes.
















Risk network expected utility, RNEU(X,C(XSi)) or RNEU , is given by:
RNEU = f(EU(X), C(XSi)) (9)
where XSi is a combination of potential strategies.
5.1.3. Risk Measure
We make use of a risk measure namely Risk Network Expected Loss Propagation Measure (RNELPM)305
in order to evaluate the relative contribution of each supply chain risk towards the loss propagation
across the entire network of risks. RNELPM is the relative contribution of each risk factor to the
propagation of loss across the entire network of supply chain risks given the scenario that the specific
risk is realised (Qazi et al., 2017).
RNELPMXRi = RNEL(X|XRi = true).P (XRi = true) (10)
5.1.4. Risk Configuration Metric310
Risk configuration metric (RCM) represents the preference of a decision maker with regard to
the configuration of risks on the modified risk matrix specific to a particular combination of available
strategies represented by XSi . A pure qualitative metric focusing on the relative number of risks within
each risk zone may be represented as follows:
RCMXSi =




where ni and ai represent the number of risks in the risk zone i and the criticality significance of315
risk zone i on a normalised scale, respectively,
N is the total number of risks.





−u(RNELXSi (X|XRi = true)).P (XRi)XSi (12)
Equation 11 is the discretised form of Equation 12 where each risk zone is assigned a preference320
value and any pair of risks located in the same zone would have the same value. The main purpose
of using Equation 12 is not to treat the individual utility functions of risks as mutually independent
and add these together, but rather to evaluate the preference of the risk configuration specific to a
combination of strategies with respect to the utility indifference curves mapped. Therefore, RCMXSi
is a preference measure to help the decision maker prioritise between two different combinations of325
strategies with regards to the distribution of risks on the risk matrix. Unlike the expected utility
approach where all possible combinations of outcomes are evaluated, we only consider the possibility
that a particular risk materialises and register the impact of all risks in turn. A combination of
strategies yielding an optimal aggregate value of these instantiations subject to the constraints of risk
zones and cost-effectiveness is finally selected.330





where RCMXS is the entire set of RCM values for all possible combinations of strategies.
5.1.5. Problem Setting
Given five zones of risk prioritisation in the modified risk matrix segregated by the utility indiffer-
ence curves (pi ∗u(li) = −Aj∀XRi(pi, li) on the curve j) and the threshold loss, l∗ (defining the portion335
of unacceptable zone represented by the area of risk matrix above that threshold line) where the set
(A1, A2, A3, A4) representing constant values arranged in descending order corresponds to the set of
curves segregating the five risk zones: unacceptable; critical; controllable; acceptable; and negligible.
What is the optimal set of combinations of strategies, S¯p = (S¯p1 , ..., S¯pr) with associated set of
total cost of mitigation strategies C(S¯p) = (C(S¯p1), ..., C(S¯pr)) for the entire risk network such that340
each S¯pi (comprising a specific combination of potential strategies) yields the (maximum) minimum
value of the (normalised) risk configuration metric (RCM) subject to the risk mitigation requirements
























Calculate expected loss for the risk network with no 
potential strategies implemented (𝑅𝑁𝐸𝐿𝑆𝐶) 
Is it the 
maximum net 
improvement? 
Select a unique combination of potential strategies 
subject to a budget constraint (𝑅𝑁𝐸𝐿) 
Yes 
Calculate the improvement in the expected loss less 
cost (𝑅𝑁𝐸𝐿𝑆𝐶 − 𝑅𝑁𝐸𝐿 − 𝐶) 
Select the optimal combination of strategies and 
map the risks on the risk matrix 
No 
Figure 4: Flow chart for selecting optimal strategies specific to a risk-neutral decision maker.
5.1.6. Proposed Algorithms
We propose two different algorithms for managing risks corresponding to the risk-neutral and345
risk-averse/risk-seeking decision makers as shown in Algorithm A.4 and Algorithm A.5, respectively.
Although the algorithms make use of our proposed risk measure, these are still adaptable for incor-
porating other risk measures. We have intentionally not included the stage of risk identification as a
relevant algorithm already exists for developing the risk network (Garvey et al., 2015). The flow charts
specific to Algorithm A.4 and Algorithm A.5 are shown in Fig 4 and Fig 5, respectively.350
5.1.7. Modelling Process
The following steps must be pursued in developing a BBN based risk network of interacting supply
chain risks and risk mitigation strategies:
• Define the boundaries of the supply network and identify stakeholders.
• Identify a network of key risks, corresponding risk sources and potential risk mitigation strategies355
on the basis of input received from each stakeholder through interviews and/or focus group
sessions.
• Refine the qualitative structure of the resulting network involving all stakeholders.
• Elicit (conditional) probability values, loss (utility) values resulting from risks and cost associated
with implementing each potential mitigation strategy and populate the BBN with all values.360
• Run the model and follow Algorithms A.4 and A.5 specific to a risk-neutral and risk-averse/risk-
seeking decision maker, respectively for assessing and treating risks.





















Fig. B.2. Flow chart for selecting optimal strategies specific to a risk-averse (seeking) decision maker 
Map the risks on the risk matrix 
Calculate 𝑅𝑁𝐸𝐿𝑆𝐶  and 𝑅𝑁𝐸𝐿𝑃𝑀 of each risk for the 
risk network with no strategies implemented 
No need of implementing additional strategies 
Calculate 𝑅𝐶𝑀 and 𝑅𝑁𝐸𝐿 for the specific 
combination of strategies 
No 
Develop the risk matrix capturing the risk appetite of 
a decision maker with five risk zones established 
Select a unique combination of strategies specific to 
each cost selected 





𝑅𝑁𝐸𝐿 − 𝐶 >
0?  







All such solutions are feasible and the one with the 
minimum 𝑅𝐶𝑀 (optimal) must be selected 
Yes (critical 
zone) 
Monitor the risks 
Increase the cost of strategies (in steps) subject to 
the budget constraint 
No Not a feasible 
solution 
Implement strategies until all risks are cleared off 




Map the risks on the risk matrix for risk monitoring 
Figure 5: low chart for selecting o al strat gies specific to a risk-averse (seeking) decision maker.
5.2. Illustrative Example: Demonstration of Key Concepts
In order to demonstrate the key concepts introduced, we present a simple network comprising five365
risks (Ri) and four potential risk mitigation strategies (Si) as shown in Figure 6. It is assumed that
each risk is associated with a loss value of 100 units and each strategy can be implemented at a cost of
30 units. Each risk is considered to have binary states: True (T) or False (F). Similarly, each mitigation
strategy is assumed to be in one of the binary states: Yes (Y) or No (N). The (conditional) probability
values are shown in Table A.1. The shaded cells represent the (conditional) probability values once370
the corresponding mitigation strategy is selected. It is interesting to consider positive correlation of
S1 with R2.
5.2.1. Risk-Neutral Decision Maker
A risk-neutral decision maker interested in maximising reduction in the cost adjusted risk network
expected loss does not account for the relative importance of each risk in terms of its relative position375
on the modified risk matrix. The decision maker would only select a combination of strategies and
make an investment if there is an increase in the reduction of risk network expected loss less cost.
Under the standard configuration, the risks are evaluated with respect to the existing strategies once
none of the potential strategies are selected. All possible combinations of potential strategies (S1, S2,
S3, S4) are shown in Table A.2.380
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shown in Table 8 (refer to the Appendix). The shaded cells represent the (conditional) probability values 
once the corresponding mitigation strategy is selected. It is interesting to consider positive correlation of 












Figure 6: Risk network modelled in GeNIe (GeNIe, 2015) 
 
 
5.3.1. Risk-Neutral Decision Maker 
A risk-neutral decision maker interested in maximising reduction in the risk network expected loss less 
cost does not account for the relative importance of each risk in terms of its relative position on the 
modified risk matrix. The decision maker would only select a combination of strategies and make an 
investment if there is an increase in the reduction of risk network expected loss less cost. Under 
standard configuration, the risks are evaluated with respect to the existing strategies whereas none of 
the potential strategies is selected. All possible combinations of potential strategies (S1, S2, S3, S4) are 
shown in Table 4.  
 
Table 4: Combinations of risk mitigation strategies 






S - 0 
A S2 30 
B S4 30 
C S3 30 
D S1 30 
E S2, S4 60 
F S2, S3 60 
G S3, S4 60 
H S1, S2 60 
I S1, S4 60 
J S1, S3 60 
K S2, S3, S4 90 
L S1, S2, S4 90 
Figure 6: Risk network modelled in GeNIe.
M S1, S2, S3 90 
N S1, S3, S4 90 
O S1, S2, S3, S4 120 
 
The relative performance of each combination of strategies is mapped in Figure 7. Each point represents 
a particular combination of strategies with corresponding cost and risk network expected loss. The solid 
line represents the threshold where the reduction in risk network expected loss is just equal to the cost 




Figure 7: Identification of optimal combinations of strategies 
 
The dotted line in black contains the optimal solution (point E) yielding maximum reduction in the 
network expected loss less cost whereas the dashed line in blue contains the optimal solution (point A) 
following the criterion of maximising benefit to cost ratio. Although point K is a feasible solution, it is not 
optimal as it fails to yield a greater reduction in network expected loss less cost relative to that of point 
E. A red cross represents an optimal solution. The decision maker will select point A if the available 
budget is less than 60 units but at least 30 units whereas for budget greater than and inclusive of 60 
units, point E is the optimal solution. 
5.3.2. Risk-Averse Decision Maker 
In case of risk-averse decision maker, we assumed the utility function as represented by Equation (17). 
We also assumed that the upper threshold for the loss value is 500 units. Similarly, the selected       









































Total cost of implementing mitigation strategies 
Figure 7: Identification of optimal combinations of strategies.
The relative performance of each combination of strategies is mapped in Figure 7. Each point
represents a particular combination of strategies ith corresponding cost and risk network expected
loss. The solid line represents the threshold where the reduction in risk network expected loss is just
equal to the cost of implementing strategies. The points (above) below this line represent all such
combinations which are (in)feasible.385
The dotted li e contains the opti al solution (point E) yielding maximum reduction in the network
expected loss less cost whereas the dashed line contains the optimal solution (point A) following the
criterion of maximising benefit to cost ratio. Although point K is a feasible solution, it is not optimal
as it fails to yield a greater reduction in the cost adjusted network expected loss relative to that of
point E. A cross represents an optimal solution. The decision maker will select point A if the available390
budget is less than 60 units but at least 30 units whereas for a budget greater than and inclusive of 60
units, point E is the optimal solution.
5.2.2. Risk-Averse Decision Maker
In the case of a risk-averse decision maker, we assume the utility function as represented by Equation









Figure 9: Risk network expected utility as summation of independent utilities 
 
 
Table 5: Optimal solutions for the objective function of maximising      
Combination of Risk 
Mitigation Strategies 
Cost of Strategies 
A            
E            




























































































Total cost of implementing mitigation strategies 
Figure 8: Expected utility for loss corresponding to various strategies.
values corresponding to the four utility indifference curves are −200, −150, −100 and −50, respectively.
u(l) = −(l)2 (14)
Maximising Risk Network Expected Utility. There are two ways of evaluating the risk network expected
utility. We can either combine the cost of strategies and loss associated with different combinations of
risks and strategies, or evaluate utility of loss and utility of cost separately and combine these together
using an appropriate function and a consistent scale. The first pproach needs an input of 512 values400
as it is not possible to aggregate the individual utility values because of utility being a non-linear
function in this example. Using the second approach, we can calculate the expected utility value for
loss corresponding to different strate ies needing only 32 values as shown in Figure 8. Points A, E and
K are the optimal combinations of strategies considering expected utility for loss, however, selection of
optimal strategies corresponding to risk network expected utility (function of loss and cost) depends405
on the relative importance of expected utility for loss (w) and utility for cost (1 − w) as shown in
Equation 15. Importantly, the scales used for the two functions must be consistent. Point O can never
be an optimal solution under any preference setting.
RNEU = w.EU(X) + (1− w).f(C(XSi)) (15)
If we assume the individual utility functions to be independent, we can use Equation 16 (Keeney





where A is a set of n attributes assumed as mutually utility independent,
Ui(Ai) is the conditional utility for attribute Ai, and
ci is the relative importance of attribute Ai.
17
Maximising Normalised Risk Configuration Metric subject to Constraints  
We mapped the risks corresponding to the standard configuration of network as shown in Figure 10. It 
can be seen that all risks are located in the unacceptable zone. Next, we evaluated the normalised risk 
configuration metric for all combinations of strategies as shown in Figure 11. As there are risks located in 
the unacceptable zone, the constraint of risk network expected loss can be ignored. Therefore, point A is 
the optimal solution corresponding to the cost of 30 units.  
 
 




Figure 11: Identification of optimal solutions 
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Total cost of implementing mitigation strategies 
Figure 9: Risk network evaluation under standard configuration (Point S).
Maximising Normalised Risk Configuration Metric subject to Constraints  
We mapped t e risks corresp nding to t e standard configuration of network as shown in Figure 10. It 
ca  be seen that all risks are located in the unacc ptable zone. Next, we evaluated the normalised risk 
configuration metric for all c mbinations of strategies as shown in Figure 11. As there are risks located in 
t e unacceptable zone, the constraint of risk network expected loss can be ignored. Therefore, point A is 
the optimal solution corresponding to the cost of 30 units.  
 
 




Figure 11: Identification of optimal solutions 
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Total cost of implementing mitigation strategies 
Figure 10: Identification of optimal solutions.
Maximising Normalised Risk Configuration Metric subject to Constraints (related to the Risk Zones).
We mapped the risks corresponding to the standard configuration of the network as shown in Figure 9.415
It can be seen that all risks are located in the unacceptable zone. Next, we evaluated the normalised
risk configuration metric for all combinations of strategies as shown in Figure 10. As there are risks
located in the unacceptable zone, the constraint of benefit exceeding the cost can be ignored. Therefore,
point A is the optimal solution corresponding to the cost of 30 units.
The risk configuration corresponding to point A is shown as Figure A.1. As two risks are still420
in the unacceptable region, we can ignore the constraint of benefit-exceeding cost, however, point E
yields the best value corresponding to both criteria (maximising normalised RCM and minimising
RNEL + cost). The risk configuration relative to point E is shown in Figure A.2. There is no risk
in the unacceptable region whereas two risks are located in the critical region. Therefore, point K is
the only feasible solution as the benefit must exceed costs for further investment as shown in Figure425
7. As point K yields higher value for normalised RCM relative to that of point E, point K is the
optimal solution for budget greater than or equal to 90 units with configuration of risks shown as
Figure A.3. Point O is not a feasible solution to be considered for optimality. A cross represents an









Figure 9: Risk network expected utility as summation of independent utilities 
 
 
Table 5: Optimal solutions for the objective function of maximising      
Combination of Risk 
Mitigation Strategies 
Cost of Strategies 
A            
E            




































































































Total cost of implementing mitigation strategies 
Table 2: Optimal solutions for the objective function of maximising normalised RCM.
6. Simulation Study430
An application of the proposed method is demonstrated through a simple supply chain risk network
(Garvey et al., 2015) as shown in Figure 11. The supply network comprises one raw material source,
two manufacturers, one warehouse and one retailer. Supply chain elements, associated risks and loss
values are shown in Table A.3. Although each domain of the supply network may comprise a number
of risks and corresponding sources, we consider limited risks for the sake of simplicity. Each risk and435
mitigation strategy is represented by binary states of True (T) or False (F) and Yes (Y) or No (N),
respectively. Assumed (conditional) probability values are shown in Table A.4 and the effectiveness of
risk mitigation strategies is represented by values appearing in the shaded cells. Potential mitigation
strategies, associated risks and costs are depicted in Table A.5.
6.1. Results440
It is assumed that the decision maker is risk-neutral. As six potential mitigation strategies were
considered for implementation, a total of 64 different combinations of strategies were evaluated as
shown in Figure 12. All the points below the solid line represent solutions for which the improvement
in risk network expected loss is more than the cost of implementing strategies. Only points A (S6) and
B (S1, S6) are the optimal solutions as all other points in the feasible region (below the solid line) fail445
to meet the other constraint. Therefore, if the decision maker is only concerned about maximising the
reduction in cost adjusted risk network expected loss, an amount of 100 units must be invested for a
budget range between 100 and 200 units whereas only the strategies amounting to 200 units must be
implemented for a budget regime of 200 units and more. The main problem with implementing these
optimal solutions is their exclusive focus on the network wide expected loss without accounting for the450


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 11: A supply chain risk network modelled in GeNIe (Source: Garvey et al. 2015).
Table 7: Potential risk mitigation strategies, associated risks and cost 
Risk Mitigation 
Strategy 
Description Associated Risk Cost 
S1 Quality Assurance Program R1 100 
S2 Scheduled Maintenance Program R3 50 
S3 Scheduled Maintenance Program R4 100 
S4 
Scheduling Software and Monitoring 
Program 
R7 50 
S5 Early Warning System R8 200 
S6 Training Simulator R10 100 
 
6.1.  Results 
We assumed that the decision maker is risk-neutral. As six potential mitigation strategies were 
considered for implementation, a total of 64 different combinations of strategies were evaluated as 
shown in Figure 16. All the points below the solid line represent solutions for which the improvement in 
risk network expected loss is more than the cost of implementing strategies. Only points A (S6) and B (S1, 
S6) are the optimal solutions as all other points in the feasible region (below the solid line) fail to meet 
the other constraint. Therefore, if the decision maker is only concerned about maximising the reduction 
in risk network expected loss less cost, an amount of 100 units must be invested for a budget range of 
100-200 (exclusive) units whereas only the strategies amounting to 200 units must be implemented for a 
budget regime of 200 units and more. The main problem with implementing these optimal solutions is 
their exclusive focus on the network wide expected loss without accounting for the configuration of risks 
corresponding to other feasible solutions. 
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Figure 12: Identification of optimal combinations of strategies.
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7. Second Approach for Selecting Optimal Strategies (Without Using the Risk Matrix)
In this approach, a different line of inquiry is adopted where the decision maker utilises the informa-
tion about cost of strategies and the impact of strategies on the risk exposure (risk network expected
loss) to select a portfolio of optimal strategies. With reference to the risk network modelled in Figure455
11, all possible combinations of strategies are mapped again in Figure 13; however, here we distinguish
between the set of Pareto-optimal solutions (non-dominated solutions) and the dominated solutions
specific to different budget constraints that are represented by filled and hollow circles, respectively.
The definition of Pareto-optimal set introduced by Spackova & Straub (2015) is adopted that contains
all such combinations of strategies for which there are no other combinations that have simultaneously460
lower costs and lower risk exposure. Points O and P are included in the set of Pareto-optimal solutions;
however, for a risk-neutral decision maker, these points fall short of the threshold criterion demanding
the equivalence of improvement in risk exposure and the additional investment. For each budget con-
straint, the point is selected which maximises the perpendicular distance between the solid line and
the parallel family of lines. Therefore, for a budget lesser than 200 units, point A is the optimal mix465
of strategies whereas for all other budget constraints, point B is the optimal solution.
In contrast to a risk-neutral decision maker, a risk-averse individual would have greater concern
with regards to the occurrence of risks and therefore, they will prefer to avoid such situations at the
cost of enhanced investment. The risk appetite of a risk-averse individual can be modelled through a
line with lower gradient (like the solid blue line in Figure 14) which indicates that the individual is470
willing to invest relatively more than the risk-neutral individual to achieve same reduction in the risk
exposure. Similarly, a risk-seeking individual represented by the red line as shown in Figure 14 (with
a steeper gradient) would only be willing to invest if the improvement in risk exposure is more than
the figure determined through the cost-benefit analysis.
For the blue line, all the solutions included in the Pareto-optimal set are feasible solutions. Depend-475
ing on the gradient of the line, different points will be optimal subject to the budget constraint. Once
7. Second Approach to Selecting Optimal Strategies (without using the Risk Matrix)  
In this approach, we focus on a different line of inquiry where the decision maker utilises the information 
about cost of strategies and the impact of strategies on the risk exposure (risk network expected loss) to 
select a portfolio of optimal strategies. With r ference to the risk network modelled in Figure 15., all 
possible combinations of strategies are mapped again in Figure 17; however, here we distinguish 
between the set of Pareto optimal solutions (non-dominated solutions) and the dominated solutions 
sp cific to different budget co straints that are represented by filled and blank circles, r spectiv ly. We 
adopt the definition of Pareto optimal set (Špačková and Straub, 2015) to contain all such combinations 
of strategies for which there are no other combinations that have simultaneously lower costs and lower 
risk exposure. Points O and P are included in the set of Pareto optimal solutions; however, for a risk-
neutral decision maker, these points fall short of the threshold criterion demanding the equivalence of 
improvement in risk exposure and the additional investment. For each budget constraint, the point is 
selected which maximises the perpendicular distance between the solid line and the parallel family of 
lines. Therefore, for a budget lesser than 200 units, point A is the optimal mix of strategies whereas for 
all other budget constraints, point G is the optimal solution. 
 
Figure 17: Pareto optimal solutions (filled circles) and dominated solutions (hollow circles) 
 
In contrast to a risk-neutral decision maker, a risk-averse individual would have greater concern with 
regards to the occurrence of risks and therefore, he will prefer to avoid such situations at the cost of 
enhanced investment. The risk appetite of a risk-averse individual can be modelled through a line with 
lower gradient (like the solid blue line in Figure 18) which indicates that the individual is willing to invest 




























Total cost of implementing mitigation strategies 
Figure 13: Pareto-optimal solutions (filled circles) and dominated solutions (hollow circles).
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neutral decision maker will be indifferent between   and  . However, the risk-averse individual will 
consider the significance of   in reducing the loss value far greater than the increase in investment 
mainly because the loss values associated with different scenarios might be deleterious to his business. 
Similarly, a risk-seeking individual would want a greater margin of improvement in      with respect to 
the same investment made. For the same improvement in      from 1600 to 1500 units as shown in 
Figure 18, the risk-seeking individual is willing to invest 50 units whereas the risk-neutral (averse) 
individual would invest 100 (240) units. 
 
 
Figure 18: Family of lines representing risk appetite influencing the set of feasible solutions 
In order to combine the cost of strategies and associated risk exposure, we need to adopt a consistent 
method of mapping these together on a single scale. For each combination of strategies, we register the 
improvement in risk exposure and reduction in mitigation cost (negative of cost) with respect to the 
current configuration of strategies already implemented. We suggest using the method of ‘swing 
weights’ (Belton and Stewart, 2002) to determine the relative weight of the two criteria where the 
decision maker is asked to consider that both improvement in      and reduction in mitigation cost are 
at the least preferred states (all risks realised and maximum possible cost of strategies incurred each 
amounting to the value of 0). Subsequently, he is given a scenario that only one of these could be 
improved to the best possible state and the one picked by him should receive the maximum weight (100) 
reflecting the significance of that criterion. He is then required to assess the overall value (over a scale of 































Total cost of implementing mitigation strategies 
Figure 14: Family of lines representing risk appetite influencing the set of feasible solutions.
the line approaches a gradient of zero, all points will be optimal solutions subject to the respective
budget constraint meaning that point P will be pick d for a budget of at lea t 550 units and similarly,
point O for a budget of at least 500 units but lesser than 550 units. For the red line mapped, it is
evident that only point A is the optimal solution for a budget of at least 100 units.480
Another approach to justifying the relevance of trade-off between the improvement in risk exposure
and the additional investment specific to the risk appetite is illustrated through a simple example.
With reference to Figure 13, a point represents a specific combination of strategies with associated
cost and risk exposure across the risk network shown in Figure 11. Risk exposure across the 12 risk
events can be represented as:485
RNEL = P (R¯1 ∩ R¯2...R¯12).L(R¯1 ∩ R¯2...R¯12)...+ P (R1 ∩R2...R12).L(R1 ∩R2...R12) (17)
Where P (R¯i) and L(Ri) represent probability of risk Ri not happening and the loss associated with
the occurrence of risk Ri, respectively.
RNEL = P (R¯).0 + P (R˜).L(R˜) (18)
Where R¯ is a scenario of no risk realising and R˜ represents a scenario of at least one risk realising.
RNEL = P (R˜).L(R˜) (19)
The improvement in RNEL subject to an additional investment helps in reducing the value of
P (R˜) and/or L(R˜). For a risk-neutral decision maker, the improvement in RNEL must be equal490
to the additional investment at the minimum. However, the loss value (L(R˜)) might have reduced
by a greater margin in comparison with the change in investment. For example, if a combination of
strategies X[Y ] yields P (R˜) and L(R˜) values of 0.2[0.2] and 100[200], respectively at a cost of 70[50]
units, the risk-neutral decision maker will be indifferent between X and Y . However, the risk-averse
individual will consider the significance of X in reducing the loss value far greater than the increase495
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in investment mainly because the loss values associated with different scenarios might be deleterious
to their business. Similarly, a risk-seeking individual would want a greater margin of improvement in
RNEL with respect to the same investment made. For the same improvement in RNEL from 1600
to 1500 units as shown in Figure 14, the risk-seeking individual is willing to invest 50 units whereas
the risk-neutral (averse) individual would invest 100(240) units.500
In order to combine the cost of strategies and associated risk exposure, there is a need to adopt
a consistent method of mapping these together on a single scale. For each combination of strategies,
we register the improvement in risk exposure and reduction in mitigation cost (negative of cost) with
respect to the current configuration of strategies already implemented. It is proposed to use the
method of ‘swing weights’ (Belton & Stewart, 2002) to determine the relative weight of the two criteria505
where the decision maker is asked to consider that both improvement in risk exposure and reduction
in mitigation cost are at the least preferred states (all risks realised and maximum possible cost of
strategies incurred each amounting to the value of 0). Subsequently, they are given a scenario that
only one of these could be improved to the best possible state and the one picked by them should
receive the maximum weight (100) reflecting the significance of that criterion. They are then required510
to assess the overall value (over a scale from 0 to 100) arising from a swing from 0 (worst state) to
1 (best state) on the other criterion corresponding to the swing from 0 to 1 on the criterion already
prioritised. The weights assigned can be normalised to add up to 1. We define β as the weighted sum
of improvement in RNEL and reduction in mitigation cost:
β = (1− a)(improvement inRNEL) + a(reduction in mitigation cost) (20)
Where a is a parameter that captures the importance of cost as to how a decision maker may515
place greater or lower weight on the cost of risk mitigation; when a = 0, the decision maker is not
concerned about the cost of implementing strategies while in the case of a = 1, they will not consider
implementing any additional strategy as the reduction in mitigation cost will be maximum at the
current configuration of strategies.
For a risk-neutral decision maker, a = 0.5 because they want to get the improvement in RNEL520
to be equal to the additional mitigation cost at the minimum and therefore, β = 0 would represent
the threshold where they are willing to invest an additional amount in order to reduce risk exposure.
Increasing values of β would yield a family of lines where the optimal solution subject to a budget
constraint would be tangent to the line with the highest β. For a risk-averse (seeking) individual, a
will be smaller (greater) than 0.5 and β > 0 would generate the corresponding family of lines.525
Equations of three solid lines shown in Figure 14 can be deduced from Equation 20 as follows:




1− a(mitigation cost) +RNELSC (22)
Where ‘mitigation cost’ accounts for the additional cost with respect to the current cost of strategies
implemented and RNELSC is the risk exposure under the current configuration of strategies.
8. Discussion
The literature review conducted revealed that there is no such framework within the existing liter-530
ature on SCRM that integrates all stages of the risk management process within a probabilistic setting
of interacting risks and captures the risk appetite of a decision maker in evaluating interdependent
risks and potential risk mitigation strategies. However, one limitation of our study is its focus on a
limited number of high quality journal articles. Papers on literature reviews have focused on the need
for exploring these themes in silo whereas an agenda on developing an integrated framework has never535
been presented.
There is a need to bring a paradigm shift towards modelling and managing a network of risks.
Instead of defining categories of risks and classifying risks accordingly, we have proposed exploring
chains of risks and adverse events. As opposed to the unidirectional flow of stages in the standard risk
management process, the proposed framework follows an iterative process where the selection of poten-540
tial strategies is contingent upon the configuration of risks corresponding to the current performance
of implemented strategies. Furthermore, evaluating a particular combination of strategies necessitates
re-assessing and re-evaluating the risk network.
BBNs have been proposed as a modelling tool for implementing the process. These are effective
in capturing the probabilistic interdependency between risks and strategies and providing a visual aid545
to the decision maker to understand dynamics between interacting factors and visualise propagation
patterns. A key merit of developing a BBN based model is its ability to include additional risks during
the risk monitoring stage without needing major changes. The proposed algorithms provide a standard
approach of implementing the process using any type of modelling technique. RMSCRM and the
proposed approach are meant to facilitate practitioners in implementing an effective risk management550
process.
As risk matrix based tools are widely used in practice (Duijm, 2015), practitioners will find this
study useful in enhancing the capability of their existing tools to deal with the network of risks. The
main benefit of adopting the risk matrix based approach is to be able to appreciate the configuration
of risks on the risk matrix and ascertain if appropriate strategies are implemented to account for the555
possibility of any adverse event happening whereas the second approach proposed does not consider
the implications of individual risk scenarios happening. However, the second approach might be viable
in the case where a decision maker is not comfortable with the risk matrix based approach and it still
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helps in determining the set of Pareto-optimal solutions and an optimal solution subject to a budget
constraint and specific risk appetite.560
8.1. Comparison of the Proposed Risk Matrix Based Method with the Standard Expected Utility based
Method
In the case of a risk network where N risks and M strategies (each having binary states) are
interdependent and the utilities associated with different consequences are not mutually independent,
we need to elicit 2(N+M) utility values; however, considering the cost of strategies being independent565
of the risk exposure, the elicitation burden is reduced to 2N values assuming that the corresponding
cost specific to each combination of strategies is evaluated as the summation of cost for each strategy
and a weighted net utility function is defined to combine the utility and cost values. It is important
to realise that the standard expected utility approach averages out the utility of all possible scenarios
with respective probability values.570
In the proposed risk matrix based approach, it is assumed that it is not possible to utilise the
expected utility approach mainly because of the substantial number of nodes involved. The decision
maker is able to partition the modified risk matrix into five zones. The risk matrix is modified in a
way that instead of registering siloed consequence values specific to the realisation of individual risks,
we make use of the impact of each risk on the risk network. In essence, different scenarios are modelled575
where each risk might realise in turn and all such scenarios are modelled for each possible combination
of strategies with associated probability of occurrence and the resulting consequence on the network.
In the case of a risk-neutral decision-maker, the use of a RNEL value alone is sufficient to decide if it
is worth investing in implementing additional strategies where the cost is compared with the enhanced
reduction in the risk exposure. However, in the case of a risk-averse (seeking) decision maker, the risk580
appetite can be modelled within the modified risk matrix in terms of establishing the boundaries of
the five risk zones.
Appropriate partitioning of the boundaries (particularly for establishing unacceptable and critical
risk zones) is significant because presence of any risk within these zones would necessitate investing
in additional strategies (with condition of benefits exceeding costs for the critical zone). However,585
even if the boundaries are incorrectly mapped and a conservative stance is adopted, only cost-effective
strategies would be selected yielding an improved configuration of risks on the modified risk matrix.
It is because we make use of RCM in choosing the combination of strategies that helps in improving
the configuration of risks and therefore, for each additional investment level, only cost-effective strate-
gies would be selected whereas the RNEL-vs.-cost map is utilised in the case of risks located in the590
critical risk zone to establish if the overall benefits exceed the cost of implementing additional strate-
gies. Therefore, the company would still benefit from the implementation of additional cost-effective
strategies resulting from the incorrect partitioning; however, these strategies would not conform to
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the actual risk appetite of the decision maker. Similarly, if the boundaries are incorrectly expanded
beyond true limits, the company might be prone to vulnerable risks exceeding their true risk appetite.595
9. Conclusions
A number of frameworks and modelling tools have been proposed in the literature on SCRM for
identifying, assessing and mitigating risks. These studies have been periodically reviewed for directing
future research. Focusing on the theme of risk management process/framework, this paper presented
a critical review of quality articles. It was established that there is no single study focusing on the600
SCRM process within an integrated framework of interacting risks and the risk appetite of a decision
maker. The articles on literature reviews were also reviewed revealing that even these articles have not
realised and emphasised the need for conducting research in this direction.
On the basis of the research gap identified, a new risk management process, namely RMSCRM ,
was introduced. There is a need for bringing a paradigm shift in terms of modelling chains/network of605
interacting risks and risk sources. Instead of modelling and managing supply chain risks in isolation,
researchers must embrace the notion of modelling and managing a network of risks and develop effective
and efficient tools for practitioners to adopt in real scenarios. There is also a need for exploring tools
that integrate all stages of the risk management process instead of focusing on separate stages (Ho
et al., 2015).610
Risk measures must be introduced that could capture the network-wide holistic impact of in-
teracting risks. However, optimising the risk network against these measures alone might result in
sub-optimal solutions as it is also important to consider the risk appetite of a decision maker. Al-
though EUT provides a standard procedure for decision making under uncertainty, it is not viable to
even assess a simple risk network comprising a limited number of risks and strategies. Therefore, we615
introduced the idea of adapting risk matrix for projecting the configuration of interdependent risks.
The risk matrix has already been modified for mapping the risk appetite of a decision maker. However,
the main limitation is its exclusive application to independent categories of risks. This paper proposed
its adaptation to the context of interdependent risk networks.
In order to present a modelling framework for the proposed RMSCRM process, we introduced a620
modelling approach grounded in the framework of BBNs. We made use of an existing risk measure,
namely RNELPM , and introduced two algorithms for managing supply chain risk network with regard
to risk-neutral and risk-seeking/averse decision makers. The algorithms can also be used in the context
of other modelling technique and/or risk measures. We demonstrated the meaning of key concepts
through an illustrative example. Furthermore, the proposed process was also demonstrated through a625
simulation study in the context of SCRM. We also introduced a second approach to determine the set
of Pareto-optimal risk mitigation strategies where the decision maker needs to establish the trade-off
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between the improvement in risk exposure and the cost of strategies without utilising the risk matrix.
The proposed risk matrix based process can help researchers focus on a new stream of research and
develop it further. Our proposed modelling approach is just intended to demonstrate the application630
of the proposed risk management process. In future, a tool integrating a number of techniques feasible
for each stage of the process can be developed and validated through case studies. The proposed
algorithms can also be used to develop robust risk management tools. We have considered binary
states for the risks and mitigation strategies which can be modelled as continuous variables. It will
also be interesting to find out the optimal combination of continuum of strategies for mitigating the635
risks. In future, empirical studies may be conducted to gauge the feasibility of the proposed modelling
framework and determine the associated challenges.
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Appendix A.750
The risk configuration corresponding to point A is shown as Figure 12. As two risks are still in the 
unacceptable region, we can ignore the constraint of benefit exceeding cost, however, point E yields the 
best value corresponding to both criteria (maximising    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and minimising ‘            ). The risk 
configuration relative to point E is shown as Figure 13. There is no risk in the unacceptable region 
whereas two risks are located in the critical region. Therefore, point K is the only feasible solution as 
benefit must exceed cost for further investment as shown in Figure 7. As point K yields higher value for 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  relative to that of point E, point K is the optimal solution for budget greater than or equal to 90 
units with configuration of risks shown as Figure 14. Point O is not a feasible solution to be considered 
for optimality. A red coloured cross represents an optimal solution.  
 
 

































Figure A.1: Risk network evaluation (point A).
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modelling technique and/or risk measures. We demonstrated the meaning of key concepts through an 
illustrative example. Furthermore, the proposed process was also demonstrated through a simulation 
study in the context of SCRM. We also introduced a second approach to determine the set of Pareto 
optimal risk mitigation strategies where the decision maker needs to establish the trade-off between the 
improvement in risk exposure and the cost of strategies without utilising the risk matrix.  
The proposed risk matrix based process can help researchers focus on a new stream of research and 
develop it further. Our proposed modelling approach is just intended to demonstrate the application of 
the proposed risk management process. In future, a tool integrating a number of techniques feasible for 
each stage of the process can be developed and validated through case studies. The proposed algorithms 
can also be used to develop robust risk management tools. We have considered binary states for the 
risks and mitigation strategies which can be modelled as continuous variables. It will also be interesting 
to find out the optimal combination of continuum of strategies for mitigating the risks. In future, 
empirical studies may be conducted to gauge the feasibility of the proposed modelling framework and 
determine the associated challenges. 
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Table A.1: Conditional probability values.
 
Table 4: Combinations of risk mitigation strategies 
 






S - 0 
A S2 30 
B S4 30 
C S3 30 
D S1 30 
E S2, S4 60 
F S2, S3 60 
G S3, S4 60 
H S1, S2 60 
I S1, S4 60 
J S1, S3 60 
K S2, S3, S4 90 
L S1, S2, S4 90 
M S1, S2, S3 90 
N S1, S3, S4 90 
O S1, S2, S3, S4 120 
 
The relative performance of each combination of strategies is mapped in Figure 7. Each point represents 
a particular combination of strategies with corresponding cost and risk network expected loss. The solid 
line represents the threshold where the reduction in risk network expected loss is just equal to the cost 














































Total cost of implementing mitigation strategies 
Table A.2: Combinations of risk mitigation strategies.
strategy is represented by binary states of ‘True (T) or False (F)’ and ‘Yes (Y) or No (N)’, respectively. 
Assumed (conditional) probability values are shown in Table 9 (refer to the Appendix) and the 
effectiveness of risk mitigation strategies is represented by values appearing in the shaded cells. 
Potential mitigation strategies, associated risks and costs are depicted in Table 7. 
 
 
Figure 15: Supply chain risk network modelled in GeNIe (GeNIe, 2015, Garvey et al., 2015) 
 
Table 6: Supply chain elements, risks and loss values 
Supply Chain Element Risk Loss 
Raw Material Source (RM) 
Contamination (R1) 200 
Delay in Shipment (R2) 400 
Manufacturer-I (M1) 
Machine Failure (R4) 200 
Delay in Shipment (R5) 400 
Manufacturer-II (M2) 
Machine Failure (R3) 200 
Delay in Shipment (R6) 400 
Warehouse (W) 
Overburdened Employee (R7)  
Damage to Inventory (R8) 500 
Delay in Shipment (R9) 600 
Flood (R12)  
Warehouse to Retailer (W-R) Truck Accident (R10) 500 
Retailer (R) Inventory Shortage (R11) 800 
 
 




Figure 13: Risk network evaluation (point E) 
 
 
Figure 14: Risk network evaluation (point K) 
 
6.  Simulation Study  
We demonstrate application of our proposed method through a simple supply chain risk network 
(Garvey et al., 2015) as shown in Figure 15. The supply network comprises a raw material source, two 
manufacturers, a warehouse and a retailer. Supply chain elements, associated risks and loss values are 
shown in Table 6. Although each domain of the supply network may comprise a number of risks and 

















































Figure A.2: Risk network evaluation (point E).
 
 
Figure 13: Risk network evaluation (point E) 
 
 
Figure 14: Risk netw rk eval ation (point K) 
 
6.  Simulation Study  
We demonstrate application of our proposed method through a simple supply chain risk network 
(Garvey et al., 2015) as shown in Figure 15. The supply network comprises a raw material source, two 
manufacturers, a warehouse and a retailer. Supply chain elements, associated risks and loss values are 
shown in Table 6. Although each domain of the supply network may comprise a number of risks and 

















































Figure A.3: Risk network evaluation (point K).
Algorithm 1: Risk network management for risk-neutral decision maker 
1: procedure RISKMANAGEMENT 
2:  procedure OPTIMALSTRATEGIES (STANDARDAPPROACH) 
3:  for       do 
4:   for       do 
5:   (   )  
 ∑ ∏             
                  
 
6:            
7:        (          )   (   )  
 
8:  for          do 
9:  for       do 
10:   (   )   
 ∑ ∏             
                  
 
11:         
           
12:         
(          )   (   )   
 
13:   if                  
     (   )     then 
14:         ̂   
15:  for  ̂      do 
16:   if      ̂̂  
     ( ̂  )       ̂  
     ( ̂  )     ( ̂  )   ( ̂  ) then 
17:  select  ̂      (     ̂̂  
     ( ̂  ))  ( ̂  )  
 
Algorithm 2: Risk network management for risk-averse or risk-seeking decision maker 
1: procedure RISKMANAGEMENT 
2:  procedure OPTIMALSTRATEGIES (STANDARDAPPROACH) 
3:  for       do 
4:   for       do 
5:   (   )  
 ∑ ∏             
                  
 
6:         
7:  for          do 
8:  for       do 
9:   (   )   
 ∑ ∏             
                  
 
10:         
    
11:         
          
     (   )  
12:   if        
           then 
13:         ̂   
14:  for  ̂      do 
15:   if      ̂  
      ̂  
    ( ̂  )   ( ̂  ) then 
16:  select  ̂            ̂  
   ( ̂  )  
17:  procedure OPTIMALSTRATEGIES (PROPOSEDAPPROACH) 
18:  for       do 
19:             
20:  if      (      (          ))   (   )  
       
21:            (          )   
      then 
22:   ̅    
23:  else   
Figure A.4: Risk network management for risk-neutral decision maker.
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Table 9: (Conditional) probability values (                                      
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Table A.4: (Conditional) probability values.
Table 7: Potential risk mitigation strategies, associated risks and cost 
Risk Mitigation 
Strategy 
Description Associated Risk Cost 
S1 Quality Assurance Program R1 100 
S2 Scheduled Maintenance Program R3 50 
S3 Scheduled Maintenance Program R4 100 
S4 
Scheduling Software and Monitoring 
Program 
R7 50 
S5 Early Warning System R8 200 
S6 Training Simulator R10 100 
 
6.1.  Results 
We assumed that the decision maker is risk-neutral. As six potential mitigation strategies were 
considered for implementation, a total of 64 different combinations of strategies were evaluated as 
shown in Figure 16. All the points below the solid line represent solutions for which the improvement in 
risk network expected loss is more than the cost of implementing strategies. Only points A (S6) and B (S1, 
S6) are the optimal solutions as all other points in the feasible region (below the solid line) fail to meet 
the other constraint. Therefore, if the decision maker is only concerned about maximising the reduction 
in risk network expected loss less cost, an amount of 100 units must be invested for a budget range of 
100-200 (exclusive) units whereas only the strategies amounting to 200 units must be implemented for a 
budget regime of 200 units and more. The main problem with implementing these optimal solutions is 
their exclusive focus on the network wide expected loss without accounting for the configuration of risks 
corresponding to other feasible solutions. 
 
 





























Total cost of implementing mitigation strategies 
Table A.5: Potential risk mitigation strategies, associated risks and cost.
34
1: procedure RISKMANAGEMENT 
2:  procedure OPTIMALSTRATEGIES (STANDARDAPPROACH) 
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Figure A.5: Risk network management for risk-averse or risk-seeking decision maker.
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